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Understand the Second World War: Teach Yourself

Understand the Second World War: Teach Yourself

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The Second World War was perhaps the most tragic and costly event in history, resulting in the deaths of over 50 million people – most of whom were civilians. The war is traditionally seen as starting in 1939 when Germany, led by Adolf Hitler, attacked Poland. A reasonable case can be made for it commencing in 1937 with the outbreak of war between Japan and China. An even better case can be made for claiming that it was not a world war until 1941 when Russia (more accurately the USSR) was attacked by Germany and the USA was brought into the war by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. By the end of 1941 the so-called Allied powers (the British Empire, Russia and the USA) were fighting against the Axis powers (essentially Germany, Italy and Japan). The war ended in 1945 with the surrender first of Germany and then of Japan (Italy had changed sides in 1943). By 1945, the Allies, with far greater resources in terms of manpower and materials, had a preponderance of strength on land and sea and in the air. Allied victory might seem to have been inevitable. However, in early 1942 the outcome of the war was still very much in the balance. The Axis powers controlled a huge swathe of the world's surface including most of Europe and large parts of Asia. The ‘turn of the tide’ in the Allies' favour in 1942–3 was in part the result of good fortune at critical moments and of the bravery of countless individuals who were ready to risk (and sacrifice) their lives for their countries and their comrades. That said, there were also large numbers of Germans and Japanese who were prepared to give their lives for their cause. Nationalism was a potent brew on both sides, ensuring a long and bloody conflict.

Insights

  • It is easy to blame French and British leaders (especially Neville Chamberlain) for trying to appease Hitler – making concessions to satisfy his demands. The hope that such a policy might avert war proved to be ill-founded. Hitler regarded appeasement policies as a sign of weakness and this may have served to encourage his aggression. However, the only real alternative to appeasement was war, which was likely to prove disastrous for Britain, France and indeed the whole of Europe. Given this situation, the attempts to appease Hitler made some sense.
  • Winston Churchill believed Britain and France should have supported Czechoslovakia and gone to war with Hitler rather than giving in to his demands at Munich. This may have been the morally correct thing to have done. However, it is far from clear that war in 1938 would have been to Britain and France's advantage. Historians remain divided about whether the two democracies would have done better had they gone to war in 1938 rather than 1939.
  • Arguably the British and French guarantees made Poland determined to resist Hitler's demands – demands which were relatively reasonable. Polish intransigence made war certain. Unfortunately, in the event of war, there was no way that Britain or France could easily assist Poland. Britain had no large army and the French army was committed to defending the Maginot Line, not to attacking Germany. However, given the situation in 1939, it seemed sensible to British and French leaders to try and deter Hitler from attacking Poland. If Poland disappeared from the map, Germany would be an even greater threat to the two democracies.
  • The Nazi-Soviet Pact allowed Hitler to attack Poland in comparative safety. He hoped (wrongly) that the Pact would result in British and French leaders abandoning their guarantees to Poland. Stalin was convinced that the Pact was in Russia's best interests. It ensured he would gain territory at Poland's expense. Moreover, he was convinced that Britain and France would go to war with Germany over Poland – to Russia's benefit. In the event, the cynical Pact was to have a devastating effect on both Germany and Russia. It encouraged Hitler to launch the Second World War – a war that Germany lost. However, Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 was to result in the deaths of over twenty million Russians.
  • Poland stood very little chance. The German army was far more mechanized and far better prepared for war. Britain and France did nothing to help their ally. There was very little Britain could do. The large French army, rather than attack Germany in the west, remained on the defensive behind the Maginot Line. Stalin, Hitler's ally, made matters totally impossible for Poland by attacking from the east on 17 September. Poland was thus defeated in little more than four weeks.
  • The French and German armies were similar in size. Nevertheless, France was totally defeated in little more than six weeks. This was largely due to superior German leadership, superior German weaponry, superior German strategy and tactics, and superior German morale. However, there was also an element of luck in the speed of the German victory. German forces struck through the Ardennes at a very weak point in the French defence system. This was as much good fortune as good judgement.
  • Most of the British army (and 140,000 French troops) escaped from France at Dunkirk in May–June 1940. It was hardly a great victory and the troops left behind most of their equipment. They also left France to fight on alone. Some French historians insist that the British should have stayed and continued to fight and that, had they done so, this might have helped bolster French morale and French resistance. Most British historians take the opposite view, claiming that without the evacuation from Dunkirk there would have been an even greater catastrophe.
  • In July 1940 Hitler offered Britain very reasonable peace terms. Churchill rejected the offer. He is usually praised for his determination to fight on. Like most Britons, he believed that Hitler could not be trusted. In the event, Britain went on to defeat Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, Churchill's decision can be seen as foolhardy. In July 1940 Britain seemed to stand little chance of defeating Hitler and to be in real danger of being invaded. Moreover, by continuing the war Churchill was to bankrupt his country and effectively lose the empire (which Hitler had offered to preserve).
  • The Luftwaffe seemed favourite to defeat the RAF in July-August 1940. It had more planes and more experienced pilots. However, by the end of September 1940 the RAF had won the Battle of Britain. Its success was due to a number of factors: radar; good leadership; good planes (especially the Spitfire); German mistakes (not least the decision to bomb London); the courage of RAF pilots; British air production; and the fact that the RAF was fighting on (or over) home territory.
  • There seems little doubt that Hitler was reluctant to invade Britain. He appreciated the difficulty of a sea-borne invasion and had no real desire to crush (what he considered to be) a fellow Germanic nation. His main desire after the defeat of France was to defeat Stalin's Russia. Consequently, he seems to have been unenthusiastic about Operation Sealion. Britain was unaware of this. Moreover, had the Luftwaffe succeeded in destroying the RAF, it is feasible that Hitler would have launched Operation Sealion.
  • Italian forces had fought quite effectively in Ethiopia in 1935–6 and in the Spanish Civil War in the late 1930s. However, they were to fight poorly for much of the Second World War, being defeated, for example, by much smaller British armies in North Africa and by Greece in 1940. The Italian navy, which on paper seemed far stronger than the Royal Navy, failed to turn the Mediterranean Sea into an Italian lake. Italy's poor performance was due to a number of factors: poor equipment; poor leadership; an inadequate industrial base; lack of natural resources; and a lack of enthusiasm for the war.
  • With hindsight it is clear that Hitler made a huge mistake when he invaded Russia, particularly as he had not yet defeated Britain in the west. Russia was far stronger than he anticipated. Ultimately Operation Barbarossa was to result in Hitler's defeat, in the same way that Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 brought down the French empire. However, an invasion of Russia in 1941 made sense. Hitler always planned to attack Russia in order to win lebensraum and destroy communism. In 1941 Germany seemed at the height of her strength. Few military experts gave Russia much chance. The Russian army, greatly weakened by Stalin's purges, had performed badly in the Winter War against Finland.
  • Given the scale of Germany's preparations, it seems inconceivable that Stalin was taken by surprise when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa. Moreover, the Russian leader had been warned by various branches of his intelligence services (and by Britain and the USA) that an attack was imminent. Yet amazingly Stalin, who trusted very few of his own people, seems to have trusted Hitler. Genuinely convinced that Hitler would not attack, he made a terrible mistake which cost his country dearly.
  • German forces came within a whisker of capturing Moscow in November–December 1941. Had the main German generals had their way, then arguably the Russian capital would have been captured even earlier. Instead, Hitler insisted on German forces attacking on a broad front rather than driving straight on towards Moscow. Hitler's intervention may thus have cost Germany the war. Ultimately the Germans lacked the strength, resources and time to capture Moscow. However, the three-pronged German attacks had huge successes in 1941, capturing Kiev and besieging Leningrad. Even had the Germans taken Moscow, it is unlikely that this would have ended Russian resistance. Moreover, the German army would certainly have found it hard to hold the Russian capital.
  • Had Japan attacked Russia in the summer of 1941, when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, it is likely that the Axis powers would have won the Second World War. However, Hitler did not encourage the Japanese to attack. He did not even tell Japan of his intentions. Thus Japan made a non-aggression pact with Stalin. Many Japanese leaders were not keen to attack Russia. The Japanese army had suffered a heavy defeat in fighting against the Russians in 1939. Moreover, the vital resources that Japan needed – not least oil – in order to continue the conflict with China lay south in the Dutch East Indies. Japanese army leaders, who favoured a ‘southern’ policy, ensured that Japan did not attack Russia.
  • A few politicians at the time and a few historians since have claimed that FDR was aware of Japan's intention to attack Pearl Harbor and allowed it to happen in order to bring the USA into the Second World War. This ‘conspiracy theory’ makes little sense. Had FDR known of the plan, US forces in the Pacific would surely have been on full alert and ready to counter the attack. US intelligence services, which had broken the Japanese radio codes, were aware that a Japanese attack was likely. However, they had no idea where the attack would come. Very few expected it to come at Pearl Harbor. All the evidence suggests that FDR and his leading advisers were astounded by the attack.
  • In the autumn of 1941 FDR wanted war with Germany. Therefore, rationally, he should have tried to avoid war with Japan. Most US military experts believed that the USA would be unable to fight a successful war on two fronts, against both Germany and Japan. However, US policy in 1940–1 forced Japan into a corner. Insisting that Japan must end her war with China, the USA threatened to seriously damage the Japanese war effort by imposing tight economic sanctions (especially on the sale of oil). Thus US policy did indeed encourage Japan to launch the attack on Pearl Harbor.
  • Given their superior fleet, the Japanese were favourites to win the battle of Midway. US success was the result of over-elaborate Japanese planning and good US intelligence, especially the interception and decoding of Japanese radio signals. It was also the result of good fortune. The US dive bombers, which destroyed the Japanese aircraft carriers, struck at a crucial time, more by good luck than good judgement.
  • Montgomery is usually regarded as Britain's best Second World War general. His victory at El Alamein, the first major victory against the Germans in the war, established his reputation. Thereafter Montgomery played crucial roles in North Africa, Sicily, France, the Netherlands and Germany. Careful of his soldiers' lives, he was affectionately known as ‘Monty’ by the men under his command. However, many historians, like many Americans at the time, now consider Montgomery to have erred too much on the side of caution and to have been far less effective than British wartime propaganda suggested.
  • Stalingrad is often seen as the most crucial battle of the Second World War. It was Germany's first great defeat. Thereafter, the boot was – apparently – well and truly on the other foot, as the Russians advanced and the Germans retreated. However, arguably, the battle was far from a total disaster for the Germans. The Russians lost a similar number of men to the Axis forces. Moreover, the Germans conducted a successful fighting retreat from Stalingrad and were still able to take the offensive in 1943.
  • It has been claimed that the Allied leaders at Casablanca should have committed themselves to an earlier ‘second front’ and should not have committed themselves to ‘unconditional surrender’. In the circumstances of early 1943, however, the decision to postpone an early invasion of France and to insist on ‘unconditional surrender’ made sense. The Allies were unlikely to be ready to launch a major invasion of France in 1943. Nor could the Allies ever have made a negotiated peace with Hitler.
  • In many respects, the Italian campaign seemed to be successful. Mussolini was overthrown, Italy changed sides, and the Germans were forced to commit large numbers of troops to Italy – troops who could otherwise have been deployed elsewhere. However, Italy was far from the ‘soft underbelly’ of the Axis. The country was easily defensible and Allied forces spent two years slogging their way up the Italian peninsula. Arguably, Allied forces might have been better deployed elsewhere – although the question remains where exactly!
  • Many historians now consider Kursk – not Stalingrad – the most decisive battle of the war. By the end of the two-week battle the Germans had suffered a huge defeat. Moreover, they had lost the initiative on the Eastern Front, an initiative they would never regain. The Russian army now pushed inexorably westwards. The boot was now well and truly on the other foot.
  • Many Europeans undoubtedly collaborated with the Nazis. Some did so actively, volunteering to fight with the Germans and supporting their policies against communists and Jews. Far more collaborated passively, in the sense that they made no attempt to resist Nazi rule. In reality, there was little else that most people could do. Resistance to German rule led to harsh reprisal.
  • Churchill put great faith in the resistance movements – faith that seems largely to have been misplaced. Resistance varied from country to country but rarely troubled the Nazis pre-1944. This was partly because the resistance movements were generally divided between communist and non-communist groups. Moreover, the Nazis were prepared to use terror to defeat (what they perceived as) terror. Active resistance to the Nazis was often thus suicidal. Resistance was most effective in areas where the terrain helped – in mountains, swamps and forests.
  • The Japanese claimed that they brought freedom to the people of Asia, who were under European colonial control. They thus won some initial support in some areas, for example, the Dutch East Indies and Burma. However, the Japanese had nothing to offer the people their conquests brought under their control. They were more imperialist than the imperialists they replaced, exploiting the conquered areas for Japan's benefit.
  • There is little evidence that Hitler intended to kill all German – never mind all European – Jews pre-1939. There was no mass killing before the start of the war and Nazi policy was to encourage Jews to leave Germany – a strange policy if Hitler intended to kill them later. However, Hitler did intend to lead Germany into war and, in the event of war, Jews were certain to be in considerable danger.
  • The precise number of Jews who died in the Holocaust will never be known. No accurate records were kept (or have survived) – particularly of all the Russians who were killed by Germans in 1941–2, some but not all of whom were Jewish. Nor was it possible then or now to define who exactly was ‘Jewish’. The Nuremberg Tribunal thought over 5 million Jews died. This seems a reasonable estimate.
  • Hitler ordered the Holocaust, probably in 1941. Himmler and Heydrich were then given the task of carrying out his order. Many people thereafter were involved in the killing process, by no means all German. But Hitler's order was the starting point. No Hitler, no Holocaust.
  • The crucial victory of Britain and the USA over German U-boats was due to a number of factors. These include good Allied (and poor German) leadership; good Allied intelligence (from Ultra); tactical innovation (for example, the use of long-range aircraft and specialist escort vessels); technical innovation (for example, improved radar systems and the use of the High Frequency Direction Finder); lack of German tactical and technical development; and the USA's massive shipbuilding capacity.
  • From 1942 the Allies bombed German cities unmercifully, the British at night, the Americans in daylight. Hundreds of thousands of Germans died, most of whom were women and children. Few Britons at the time questioned the morality of bombing. Many thought it would help win the war by destroying German morale and Germany's capacity to wage war. Others saw it as revenge for the German bombing of Britain in 1940–1. However, the Americans had more doubts about the morality of killing German civilians: thus their efforts to hit particular strategic targets (and not just kill people).
  • Allied strategic bombing undoubtedly weakened Germany's capacity to wage war. Germany's industrial base was severely damaged. However, it was by no means destroyed. Ironically, German production was at its height in 1944, at a time when bombing was also at its height. It may also be the case that it cost the Allies far more to produce planes than the damage they actually inflicted. But without the bombing German war production would have been far higher. Bombing thus helped win the war.
  • Operation Overlord was successful for a number of reasons, not least excellent leadership and planning and complete Allied control of both sea and air. Another crucial factor was Allied deception. The Germans had no idea when and where D-Day was going to be. Taken by surprise, the Germans were unable to prevent Allied forces establishing a bridgehead on 6 June. Once this was established, the odds were very much in favour of the Allies.
  • The German attack in the Ardennes in December 1944 was Hitler's last attempt to regain the initiative. Due to a number of factors, not least poor weather and Allied complacency, the German attack was successful at first. But given the fact that German tanks were desperately short of fuel, the attack never stood much chance of success and in the event was easily defeated.
  • Churchill and Montgomery were keen for British and American forces to advance quickly through Germany and capture Berlin ahead of the Russians. Eisenhower opposed the idea. It had been agreed by the Allied leaders that Berlin should be in the post-war Russian zone. It thus made sense to let the Russians capture the German capital and suffer high casualties in the process.
  • General MacArthur was committed to the liberation of the Philippines to which he had promised to ‘return’. However, the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Ernest King and Admiral Nimitz, wanted to hop from the southern Philippines straight to Formosa (Taiwan). From there US planes could bomb Japan into surrender. MacArthur got his way. But US strategists underestimated the strength of Japanese resistance in the Philippines and the campaign proved far more costly than envisaged. It is far from certain, however, whether an attack on Formosa would have been more successful.
  • Japanese suicide attacks – on land, at sea and most famously in the air – were a major feature of the war in the Pacific in 1944–5. The kamikaze pilots, in particular, inflicted considerable damage on American warships. However, the US quickly devised ways of countering the threat and neither suicide missions nor fanatical Japanese resistance could stop the inexorable progress of US forces in the Pacific.
  • Some historians believe that Japan was on the point of surrender in August 1945. If this was the case, there was no need to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, it is far from certain that Japan was ready to surrender. It may well be that the dropping of the two atomic bombs convinced Emperor Hirohito to intervene and demand surrender. If this was the case, then the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki may well have actually saved many lives. Hundreds of thousands of Allied and Japanese would have died, had the war continued even for just a few more months.
  • Technology, particularly the capacity to produce high-quality weapons, was crucial in the Second World War – as in all wars. The fact that the Allies could put much greater scientific and material resources into research and development gave the USA and Britain, in particular, a huge advantage. Significantly, the most sophisticated and terrible weapon of the war, the atomic bomb, was developed in the USA – with aid from Britain and Canada. Technical advances on the intelligence front, not least the information from Ultra, played a major role in enabling the Allies to win the war.
  • No case can be made for the Axis leaders who lost the war. A case can be made for Stalin who led his country to brutal victory, learning from some terrible mistakes in 1941–2. A better case can be made for Churchill who inspired Britons (and Americans) with his oratory and who worked hard to maintain the Grand Alliance. An even better case can be made for FDR. He made virtually all the right strategic decisions and gave free rein to a brilliant military team which he appointed.
  • The Allied powers collaborated to a far greater extent than the Axis powers. The so-called Allies – imperialist Britain, capitalist America and communist Russia – were far from natural bedfellows. Churchill and FDR were both suspicious of Stalin, while Stalin and FDR both longed to see the end of the British Empire. However, the three leaders put aside their differences and worked to a common end – the defeat of Hitler. The British and Americans particularly worked well together. The Russians, by contrast, tended to fight their own war in the east, with some material support from their western allies.
  • It might seem obvious that the defeated nations – Germany and Japan – suffered most. Germany was terribly bombed, invaded, occupied, lost territory and was then effectively split into two. Japan lost her large empire and was heavily bombed, ultimately with atomic bombs. But the victorious powers – the USA apart – also suffered. Britain was effectively bankrupt by 1945. Russia had been devastated by German invasion and may have lost over 25 million people.
  • Until the Second World War, it was rare for leaders of defeated nations to be tried and executed for war crimes. There must be some doubt about the extent to which German and Japanese leaders were fairly tried, particularly as many were sentenced to death. However, there is no doubt that terrible atrocities were committed by both the German and Japanese governments during the war. There was a natural enough view that someone should be brought to justice for those atrocities.
  • Given the differences between Russia, the USA and Britain, the Cold War seems to have been almost inevitable. Stalin did not trust the West. The West, with better cause, did not trust Stalin. It was perhaps natural for Stalin to wish to impose communist regimes on those parts of Eastern Europe that Russian forces had supposedly ‘liberated’. But by so doing, Stalin was breaking the promises he had made at Yalta. After 1945 an Iron Curtain did descend across Europe. The Western powers had to be on their guard to ensure that the whole of Europe did not fall under communist control. Thus, the Cold War.
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